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Abstract
We extend the collective model of household behavior to allow for the
existence of public consumption. We show how this model allows to ana-
lyze welfare consequences of policies aimed at changing the distribution of
power within the household. In particular, we claim that our setting pro-
vides an adequate conceptual framework for addressing issues linked to the
’targetting’ of speciﬁcb e n e ﬁts or taxes. We also show that the observation
of the labor supplies and the household demand for the public good allow
to identify individual welfare and the decision process. This requires either
a separability assumption, or the presence of a distribution factor.
1. Introduction
The ‘targeting’ view It is by now widely accepted that intrahousehold distri-
bution of income and decision power matters. Numerous empirical studies have
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and Institute for Fiscal Studies.shown that, contrary to an implicit postulate of the standard framework, target-
ing a beneﬁt to a particular household member (say, the wife) may have impor-
tant consequences on the ultimate use of the corresponding resources. Thomas
(1990) argued early on that male and female non labor incomes have a very dif-
ferent impact on children’s health and demographics; similar conclusions have
been reached by, among others, Schultz (1990), Phipps and Burton (1998), Bour-
guignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (1993) and Lundberg, Pollak and
Wales (1997). More recently, Thomas et al. (1997), using an Indonesian survey,
have shown that the distribution of wealth by gender at marriage has a signiﬁ-
cant impact on children’s health in those areas where wealth remains under the
contributor’s control.1 Duﬂo (2000) has derived related conclusions from a careful
analysis of a reform of the South African social pension program that extended
the beneﬁts to a large, previously not covered black population. Speciﬁcally, Duﬂo
ﬁnds that the consequences of this windfall gain on child nutrition dramatically
depends on the gender of the recipient.2 Such ﬁndings have potentially crucial
normative implications on the design of aid policies, social beneﬁts, taxes and
other aspects of public policy.
However, while the ’targeting’ view has strong empirical support and major
policy implications, its theoretical foundations remain somewhat weak. After all,
the standard methodological tool for studying household behavior is (or was until
recently) the ’unitary’ model, which relies on the assumption that the household
maximizes a unique utility function. This assumption directly implies that target-
1See also Galasso (1999) for a similar investigation.
2See also Bertrand et al. (1999) for an investigation of labor supply of younger women using
the same data base, and Rubalcava and Thomas (2000) for a study of the impact of beneﬁts on
female labor supply in the US.
2ing cannot be eﬀective, since the various sources of income will always be pooled
at the household level for the sake of decision making.
An alternative, increasingly popular framework for studying household behav-
ior is the ’collective’ approach, whereby individuals with speciﬁc( a n di ng e n e r a l
diﬀerent) preferences make Pareto eﬃcient decisions. This general setting in-
cludes, as particular cases, bargaining models (under symmetric information), as
well as a number of other settings. The collective model is aimed at formalizing
the notion of ’decision powers’ within the household, and the idea that changes
in respective powers typically generate changes in behavior even when total re-
sources are kept constant - a key insight of the ’targeting’ view. In that sense, the
collective approach seems to provide the natural theoretical background for issues
related to targeting.
The ﬁrst goal of the present paper is to support this claim. We provide a fully
developed theoretical framework within which these issues can be addressed. In
this model the household budget constraint is pooled and there are no ‘hypothe-
cated’ funds. However, complex decisions processes are allowed for, provided they
satisfy a basic eﬃciency requirement; namely, outcomes are assumed to be eﬃ-
cient in the Pareto sense. Diﬀerent decision processes lead to diﬀerent locations
of the outcomes on the Pareto frontier, and to each location correspond (implic-
itly or explicitly) a set of Pareto weights for the family members. These weights
fully summarize the decision process. A basic goal of the collective approach is
precisely to analyze how the decision process, i.e. the individual weights, can be
aﬀected by prices, incomes and other exogenous factors, and how such changes
inﬂuence household decisions. From a collective perspective, targeting may thus
matter through its impact on respective weights of household members. Paying
3ab e n e ﬁt to the wife instead of the husband may twist the balance of powers in
favor of the former; everything (i.e., preferences and budget constraints) equal,
this may (and in general will) ultimately change the outcome.
We illustrate how the collective approach works by considering a particular
problem. Several studies argue that on average, ‘mothers care more for children
than fathers’, in the sense that an increase in the mother’s power within the
couple results in more expenditures spent on children. We analyze the theoretical
underpinnings of this claim within a collective approach. We prove that a shift
in the (Pareto) weights favoring a member boosts the demand for a public good
if and only if the marginal willingness to pay of this member is more sensitive to
increases in (her) private consumption than that of the other member. In other
words, the key property is not that the mother has a larger willingness to pay
for children goods (out of her resources), but that her willingness to pay is more
responsive to changes in these resources than the father’s.
Mapping theory and observed behavior: identiﬁability Our ﬁrst claim,
thus, is that the collective model may provide an adequate conceptual toolbox
for analyzing policy issues linked to intrahousehold allocation of power. Still, its
empirical relevance has to be asserted. Two aspects are of particular importance:
The empirical characterization of household behavior stemming from a collective
framework, and the identiﬁability of the structural model from observed behavior.
During the last decade, important progresses have been made on the charac-
terization problem. Chiappori (1988, 1992), Browning and Chiappori (1998) and
recently Chiappori and Ekeland (2003) have derived increasingly general neces-
sary conditions for a given function to be the collective demand of a group of given
4size. However, whenever welfare implications are at stake, characterization is not
enough. When theory is used to formulate normative judgments, identiﬁability
becomes a crucial issue. To be useful, a theory should provide ways of recover-
ing the underlying, welfare relevant structure (preferences, decision process) from
observed behavior. From this perspective, the collective model exhibits an im-
portant weakness: While some identiﬁcation results have been obtained so far,
basically all rely on the assumption that commodities are privately consumed.3
Such a setting, which excludes public consumption within the household, seems
inappropriate for the study of decisions regarding children, since it is natural to
assume that both parents derive utility (albeit possibly to a diﬀerent extent) from
children’s well-being. In other words, while the collective process seems to pro-
vide a very natural conceptual context for analyzing intrahousehold allocation of
power, it is fair to say that, in the present state, not enough is known about
collective behavior with public goods to actually ground empirical analysis within
the collective framework.
The second goal of the present paper is precisely to ﬁll this gap. In a related
and complementary paper, Chiappori and Ekeland (2004) analyze identiﬁability
in the collective framework from a very general perspective.4 In this paper, we
concentrate on a version of the collective model that has been extensively used
for empirical applications5, namely Chiappori’s (1992) model of collective labor
3An important exception is a paper by Fong and Zhang (2001), who consider a model in
which leisure can be consumed both privately and publicly. Although the two alternative uses
are not independently observed, they can in general be identiﬁed under a separability restriction,
provided that the consumption of another exclusive good (e.g., clothing) is observed.
4For further results on the collective model and identiﬁcation see also Donni (2000)
5See for instance Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) and Blun-
dell et al. (2003).
5supply, and we introduce children in this speciﬁc context. We assume that both
parents care about children’s welfare (or equivalently that expenditures on chil-
dren are a public good within the household), but possibly to a diﬀerent extent;
identifying from observed behavior how much each parent cares for expenditure
on children is precisely one of the goals of this line of research. Using a model
that incorporates labour supply is particularly appropriate in the context where
the public expenditures are taken to be for children; in a more general setting an-
alyzed in our paper time may be used for market activities, household production
and leisure.
We show that this model is fully identiﬁable; i.e., parents’ individual prefer-
ences and the decision process (as summarized by the Pareto weights) can gener-
ically be recovered from observed behavior.6 In particular, the observation of
c h a n g e si ne x p e n d i t u r e so nc h i l d r e ni nr e s p o n s et oc h a n g e si nw a g e sa l l o w so n e
to recover each parent’s willingness to pay for children expenditures. As always
identiﬁability requires restrictions. In our case we show that if leisure and individ-
ual consumption are separable from expenditure on children then we can identify
individual preferences on private and public goods as well as the Pareto weights,
just by observing individual labour supply, aggregate household consumption, the
expenditure on the public good and wages. We also show that if separability is
not a valid assumption knowledge of a distribution factor, i.e. a variable driving
6We use here the standard distinction between identiﬁability and identiﬁcation (see f.i. Koop-
mans 1949). A model is identiﬁable when an assumed perfect observation of behavior would
enable to fully recover the underlying, structural model. For instance, the standard consumer
model is identiﬁable because (as it is well known) preferences can be uniquely recovered from
demand functions. Identiﬁcation, on the other hand, relates to the more general problem of
the relationship between data and theory, in which the limits to the observation of behavior are
paramount. See Chiappori and Ekeland (2004) for a more precise discussion of this distinction,
and Blundell et al (2003) for a discussion of identiﬁcation in a collective framework.
6the Pareto weights but not preferences,7 allows full identiﬁcation. Interestingly,
the separability assumption may be tested without fully identifying the model,
allowing us to ascertain the informational requirements for identiﬁcation ap r i o r i .
Finally, the model is extended to include household production. In a way
this relaxes further the assumptions of the model because it allows some aspect
of time to be public within the household and further reinforces the justiﬁcation
of considering the identiﬁcation issues within the context of labour supply. We
consider a framework in which the public good is used, together with time for each
individual, as an input to household production. Again we show that the model
is identiﬁable, under the assumption of productive eﬃciency, so long as time use
data is available, detailing the time inputs that go into household production (as
opposed to pure leisure). Of course the measurement problems here can be severe,
but this discussion points to both the importance of collecting data on time use
and the importance of distinguishing expenditure on private and public goods.
2. The framework
2.1. Commodities, preferences, distribution factors
We consider a static version of the collective model of labor supply for a two-
member (i =1 ,2) household. There are three commodities: Two individual
leisure L1,L 2 and a Hicksian composite good C; wages (respectively non labor
income) are denoted w1 and w2 (respectively Y ), while the price of the Hicksian
good is normalized to one. In contrast with previous versions of the model, we
assume that the Hicksian good is used for private expenditures and some public




2 + K (2.1)
where K denotes the level of expenditures for the public good. A natural (but
n o te x c l u s i v e )i n t e r p r e t a t i o ni st h a tK represent the amount spent on children.
The identiﬁability results we will present do not require variations in the price of
the public good.
An important tool to achieve identiﬁcation is the presence of distribution fac-
tors (Bourguignon et al., 1995). These are deﬁned as variables that can aﬀect
group behavior only through their impact on the decision process. Think, for
instance, of the choices as resulting from a bargaining process. Typically, the
outcomes will depend on the members’ respective bargaining positions, and any
variable in the household’s environment that may inﬂuence these positions (EEPs
in McElroy’s (1990) terminology) potentially aﬀects the outcome. Such eﬀects are
of course paramount, and their relevance is not restricted to bargaining in any
particular sense. One crucial insight of the ’targeting’ literature is precisely that
any variable that changes the balance of powers within the household (say, pay-
ing a beneﬁt to the wife instead of the husband) may, everything equal, have an
impact on observed collective behavior. Throughout the paper, we denote by z a
distribution factor, and we assume that z is a continuous variable.8
As it is standard, we assume that L1,L 2,C and K are observed (as func-
tions of w1,w 2,Y and z), while the distribution of private consumption within
8For instance, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) use sex ratio as a continuous distribu-
tion factor for the identiﬁcation of a collective model of labor supply. Other examples include
non labor income (Thomas 1990), labor income in a model involving constrained labor supply
(Browning et al. 1994), wealth at marriage (Thomas et al 1997), and beneﬁts (Rubacalva and
Thomas 2000).
8the couple (C = C1 +C2)i sn o t .W ea s s u m et h a tt h ef u n c t i o n sL1 (w1,w 2,Y,z),
L2 (w1,w 2,Y,z),C(w1,w 2,Y,z)a n dK (w1,w 2,Y,z) are twice continuously dif-
ferentiable.
Individual i is characterized by diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly con-
vex preferences %ion leisure, private consumption and the level of public expen-
ditures. We assume that the bundle (w1,w 2,Y,z) varies within a compact subset
K of R3
+ × R; then the vector (Li,Ci,K) varies within some compact set K0 of
R3
+. The preferences are represented by a twice continuously diﬀerentiable utility
function Ui, and we assume that Ui is such that the Gaussian curvature of any
indiﬀerence curve is positive at any point of K0 (Ui has no critical point on K0).
By a well known theorem9, preferences can then be represented by a diﬀeren-
tiable strictly concave function Ui on K0.10 Throughout the paper, we use such a
representation of individual preferences.
In some sections of the paper, we make the assumption that individual con-

















where Wi and ui are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and
strongly concave. The separability assumption is certainly restrictive, since the
level of expenditures on children (say, paying for day-care) may be expected to af-
fects the trade-oﬀ between consumption and labor supply at the individual level.
We shall see below when it can be relaxed. One point has however to be em-
phasized here. By separability we do not imply that individual preferences are
9See for instance. Mas Colell 1985, p. 80
10Ad i ﬀerentiably strictly concave function such that the Gaussian curvature of any indiﬀer-
ence curves is positive at any point is sometimes called a strongly concave function.
9not aﬀected by the presence of children. Indeed, we do not use or suggest using
observations on the behavior of couples without children or on singles to identify
preferences. The latter may be diﬀerent in arbitrary ways for individuals in all
these states. The separability concerns expenditures on the public good, taken
here to be children. In other words, even under the separability assumption, we
allow individual preferences (e.g., the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure) to depend on the presence on children; we simply assume
that when children are present, preferences are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by how
much is actually spent on them.
2.2. The decision process
Pareto eﬃciency Following the usual strategy of collective models (Chiappori,
1988, 1992, Blundell et all, 2001), we assume that the decisions made by the
household are Pareto eﬃcient. This is equivalent to assuming that household
allocations are determined as solutions to the problem
maxL1,L2,C1,C2,K λU1 (L1,C1,K)+( 1− λ)U2 (L2,C2,K)
subject to the overall budget constraint
w1L1 + w2L2 + C1 + C2 + K = w1 + w2 + Y
(2.2)
(where the time endowment is normalized to one); note that, since the Ui are
strictly concave, so is the maximand of program (2.2). The Pareto weight λ ≥ 0
reﬂect the relative weight of member 1 in the household. This can be a function
of wages (w1 and w2)a sw e l la so fn o nl a b o ri n c o m eY and distribution factors.
We assume that the Pareto weight is continuously diﬀerentiable in w1,w 2,Y and
the distribution factors, z (if any).
10In practice, thus, observable behavior (i.e., labor supplies, children expendi-
tures and aggregate private consumption) stem from the maximization of some





















H is not a standard utility function because it depends on the Pareto weight λ,
which itself varies with prices and income; technically, H is thus price-dependent,
which implies for instance that the resulting demand functions will typically not
satisfy Slutsky symmetry. However, H exhibits separability properties, in the
sense that some marginal rates of substitution do not depend on the Pareto weight





























In words: At the equilibrium point, the household’s marginal rate of substitu-
tion between individual i’s leisure and private consumption is equal to the cor-
responding individual’s marginal rate of substitution between her labour supply
and consumption. Hence in general it only depends on Li,Ci and K, and not on
the spouse’s labor supply nor on the Pareto weight.
11Conditional sharing rule Just as in the private consumption case, the solu-
tion to the household problem (2.2) can be thought of as a two stage process.
At stage one, agents agree on public expenditures, as well as on a particular dis-
tribution of the residual non labor income between them. At stage two, each of
the two members freely choose their level of consumption and labor supply, con-
ditional on the level of public expenditures and the budget constraint stemming
from stage one. Technically, let L∗i (w1,w 2,Y,z),C∗i (w1,w 2,Y,z),i =1 ,2, and
K∗ (w1,w 2,Y,z) be the solution of problem (2.2), and deﬁne ρi by:
ρi (w1,w 2,Y,z)=wiL
∗i (w1,w 2,Y,z)+C
∗i (w1,w 2,Y,z) − wi
Here, ρ1 and ρ2 deﬁne the sharing rule.I n w o r d s , ρi is the fraction of residual
non labor income allocated to member i; ρi is conditional in the sense that the
members share what is left for private consumption after purchasing the public
good. Hence ρi can be positive or negative, and
ρ1 (w1,w 2,Y,z)+ρ2 (w1,w 2,Y,z)=Y − K
∗ (w1,w 2,Y,z)
We now have the following result:


















i = wi + ρi
where K = K∗ (w1,w 2,Y,z) and ρi = ρi (w1,w 2,Y,z).
12Proposition 1 states that each agent chooses his (her) private consumption
and labor supply by maximizing utility, under the constraint that he (she) cannot
spend more than his (her) share of residual non labor income. The proof is
straightforward: If a higher utility could be achieved at the same cost (say, for
some (L0i,C0i), then the maximand in (2.2) could be increased by replacing (Li,Ci)
with (L0i,C0i), a contradiction.
An important remark is that the existence of a (conditional) sharing rule, while
implied by eﬃciency, is not equivalent to eﬃciency. Any eﬃcient decision process
can be associated with a sharing rule; but, conversely, an arbitrary sharing rule is
not in general compatible with eﬃciency for a given level of public expenditures.
The intuition for this result goes as follows. For given preferences, there exists a
continuum of Pareto eﬃcient allocations. In general11,d i ﬀerent eﬃcient outcomes
correspond to diﬀerent levels of the public good and diﬀerent distributions of
private consumptions and labor supplies. Hence, although conditional on K a
consumption/labour supply allocation maybe (constrained) eﬃcient, this does not
mean that the particular level K is itself the solution to an eﬃcient household
allocation under the prevailing prices; consequently, the corresponding Li,C i
allocation may (and will in general) be ineﬃcient. This shows the limit of the
‘two stage’ interpretation of the decision process; while formally convenient (as
it will become clear below), it should not hide the fact that the level of public
expenditures cannot be chosen independently of the allocation of private resources.
¿From a more technical perspective, for any given sharing rule compatibility
with the observed level of public expenditures imposes additional conditions, a
crucial point for the identiﬁability results below. However, before stating these
11i.e., except for very particular cases such as quasi-linear preferences
13conditions, it is convenient to introduce two concepts of indirect utility.
Indirect utilities Let V i (wi,ρi,K) denote the value of program (2.5); intu-
itively, V i is a conditional (on K) indirect utility function for i.W e c a l l i t t h e
individual indirect utility of agent i because it only depends on i’s preferences; i.e.,
it does not vary with the particular decision process at stake (although its argu-
ment ρi certainly does). As usual, there is a one-to-one correspondence between













i = wi + ρi
Note also that since preferences are strictly increasing, ∂V i/∂ρi > 0 at each point.
Secondly, for any particular function ρi (w1,w 2,Y,z), we can express V i di-
rectly as a function of wages, non labor income and public expenditures. This
requires a slightly technical construction, however, since we must formally trans-
late the fact that K is kept constant. Speciﬁcally, let O be some open subset of
K such that ∂K∗/∂z does not vanish on O. By the implicit function theorem,
the condition K∗ (w1,w 2,Y,z)=K allows one to express z as some function ζ of
(w1,w 2,Y,K). Then we can deﬁne, over O, the function ˜ V i by:
˜ V
i (w1,w 2,Y,K)=V
i [wi,ρi (w1,w 2,Y,ζ (w1,w 2,Y,K)),K]
In words, V i describes i’s indirect utility when facing a private allocation ρi and
a level of children expenditures K, while, for any given function ρi, ˜ Vi describes i’s
indirect utility when faced with a wage income bundle w1,w 2,Y and a distribution
factor z such that public expenditures are exactly K. The distribution factor plays
14a key role here because it provides an additional dimension, thus allowing w1,w 2,Y
to vary freely (i.e., in a three dimensional set) while K is kept constant.
We propose to call ˜ V i the collective indirect utility of agent i,t or e ﬂect the
fact that the deﬁnition of ˜ V i implicitly includes the sharing function ρi,h e n c e
an outcome of the collective decision process. In particular, in contrast with
the individual indirect utility V i, the collective indirect utility ˜ V i can only be
deﬁned in reference to a particular decision process. Note that whenever normative
judgments are at stake, the collective indirect utility is the relevant concept, since
it measures the level of utility that will ultimately be reached by each agent,
taking into account the redistribution that will take place within the household.
Determination of public expenditures We can now characterize the eﬃ-
ciency conditions for public good expenditures. These take the standard, Bowen-
Lindahl-Samuelson form. Namely, assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst order






=1 ( 2 . 7 )
Equivalently, one can use the two-stage representation and express the con-





1 (w1,ρ1,K)+( 1− λ)V
2 (w2,ρ2,K)




















=1 ( 2 . 8 )
The ratio
∂V i/∂K
∂V i/∂ρ is i’s marginal willingness to pay for the public good; condi-
tion (2.8) states that the individuals’ marginal willingness to pay must add up to
the price of the public good.
Finally, the same condition can be expressed in terms of collective indirect
utilities. After simple calculations, one gets
α
∂ ˜ V 1/∂K
∂ ˜ V 1/∂Y
+( 1− α)
∂ ˜ V 2/∂K
∂ ˜ V 2/∂Y










In words: If non labor income is changed by one dollar, z being adjusted so as to
keep K constant, α is the fraction of this change born by member 1 (obviously,1−α
is born by member 2). Again, (2.9) expresses that agents are indiﬀerent to one
marginal dollar being spent on the public good, the cost being divided between
the agents according to the proportions thus deﬁned.
Separability For general preferences the level of public consumption inﬂuences
the optimal choice of consumption and labor supply through two channels: An
income eﬀect (i.e., more public expenditures means less total private consump-
tion, hence (presumably) a tighter private budget for both members) and the
direct impact of public expenditures on the consumption-leisure trade-oﬀ.I nt h e
separable case (S), however, the second eﬀect disappears. Technically, the second










i = wi + ρi
These separability properties at the individual level are preserved in the op-
timal value function of the household, although in a somewhat speciﬁcw a y . 12 If
individual utilities satisfy the separability property (S), then from equation (2.4)
above, the household’s marginal rate of substitution between individual i’s leisure







where the right hand side only depends on Li and Ci. This means that, if we
control for individual consumptions, the household MRS does not depend on public
good expenditures K. The property must however be handled with care, since
it does not lead to the standard separability tests of consumer theory. The right
hand side expression in (2.11) is the MRS of individual i,w h i c hi st a k e na t( Li,Ci).
Since Ci is not observed, one cannot directly test this property in the usual way.
One can also express separability in terms of indirect utilities. The individual
indirect utility V i is such that the individual wage and sharing rule are separable
from the public expenditure K. Speciﬁcally, let vi (wi,ρi)d e n o t et h ev a l u eo f
program (2.10); note that vi does not depend on K directly. Then the individual’s







12We are indebted to the editor, Fernando Alvarez, for pointing out this point.
17More interestingly, the deﬁnition of collective indirect utility ˜ V i no longer
requires the presence of a distribution factor. To see why, assume away for a
moment the distribution factor (so that all functions only depend on (w1,w 2,Y)),
and let y denote the portion of non labor income not devoted to the purchase of
the public good:
y = Y − K (w1,w 2,Y)
Clearly, y can be positive or negative. Again, consider some open subset O0
of K such that ∂K/∂Y 6=1o nO0; i.e., an additional dollar of non labor income
would not be entirely spent on the public good, a natural requirement. By the
implicit function theorem, the equation above allows one to express Y as some
function Υ of (w1,w 2,y). Then we can deﬁne, over O0, the function ˜ V i by:
˜ V
i (w1,w 2,y)=V
i [wi,ρi (w1,w 2,Υ(w1,w 2,y))]
Intuitively, since the subutility ui can be deﬁned independently of K, the addi-
tional dimension provided by the distribution factor is no longer needed.
2.3. Collective analysis of welfare: An illustration
This section illustrates the way collective models allow one to study ’targeting’,
and more generally issues related to intrahousehold distribution of power and its
impact on behavior. Our claim is that an explicit formalization of individual
preferences over private and public consumption is crucial for the purposes of
analyzing the welfare implications of policy reforms and for understanding issues
such as child poverty. The implications are far reaching and they are relevant
for policy both in the context of developing countries as well as for industrialized
ones.
18The question we consider here is the following: How does a change in the
distribution of power within the household - i.e., here, a change in the Pareto
weight λ -a ﬀect the expenditure on the public good? In particular, when is it the
case that an improvement of the mother’s position (say, because a beneﬁti sn o w
targeted to her) increases children’s expenditures? We shall see that an answer
can readily be given in the theoretical context just developed.
For notational simplicity, we deﬁne ρ ≡ ρ1;t h e nρ2 = Y − K − ρ = y − ρ.










2 (w2,Y − ρ − K,K)=1
where MWPi denotes i’s marginal willingness to pay for the public good. Using























∂ρ1 + ∂V 2
∂ρ2
´ (2.12)




∂ρ1∂K − (1 − λ)
³
∂2V 2















(∂ρ1)2 +( 1− λ) ∂2V 2
(∂ρ2)2
i (2.13)
We assume that preferences are such that the ‘goods’ ρ and K are normal,
i.e. an increase in non labor income boosts both private and public consumptions.
Then MWPi is increasing in ρi,d e c r e a s i n gi nK, and the expression in the square
19brackets in ∂ρ/∂λ is negative. Also, ∂V 1/∂ρ1 and ∂V 2/∂ρ2 are both positive.
Finally, we may, without loss of generality, assume that the diﬀerence DMWP ≡
∂MWP1
∂ρ1 − ∂MWP2
∂ρ2 is positive. Then ∂K
∂λ has the same sign as
∂ρ
∂λ .I n c r e a s i n g
λ can thus either increase K and ρ or decrease both. But the second case is
impossible, because an increase in 1’s weight would then reduce the utility of 1, a




We can summarize our ﬁndings in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. Assume that preferences are such that each member i’s marginal
willingness to pay for the public good is decreasing in the level of public good and
increasing in the member’s share ρi. Then a marginal change in a member’s Pareto
weight increases the household’s expenditures on the public good if and only if
the marginal willingness to pay of this member is more sensitive to changes in
his/her share than that of the other member
2.4. Example: Cobb-Douglas preferences





i +( 1− αi)logC
i + δi logK (2.14)
so that indirect utilities are given by:
V
i (wi,ρi,K)=αi logαi+(1− αi)log(1− αi)+log(wi + ρi)−αi logwi+δi logK




















⇔ δ1 > δ2 (2.15)




where l is a parameter; note that λ is increasing in l. Straightforward computa-




(1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2




(1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2




(1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2




(1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2
(w1 + w2 + y) (2.19)
K =
δ1lw1 + δ2w2
(1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2
(w1 + w2 + y) (2.20)




=( δ1 − δ2)
w1w2 (w1 + w2 + y)
(lw1 + δ1lw1 + w2 + δ2w2)
2
which is positive if and only if δ1 > δ2, hence from (2.15) if and only if ∂MWP1
∂ρ >
∂MWP2
∂ρ . Note, however, that even with δ1 > δ2 it may be the case that MWP1 =
δ1
w1+ρ1
K <M W P 2 = δ2
w2+ρ2
K (particularly if w2 is large with respect to w1).
This remark illustrates the fact that increasing member 1’s weight may increase
21children expenditures even though member 2’s marginal willingness to pay for
children is higher.
3. Identiﬁability
The identiﬁability question relates to our ability to recover individual preferences
and the Pareto weight from the sole observation of labor supplies and the ex-
penditures on the public good, as functions of wages and non labor income. As
argues in the Introduction, identiﬁability is a key requirement for guaranteeing
the empirical relevance of the normative approach described above: Despite all
the conceptual insights it helps formalize, the collective approach would be of lit-
tle help if the concepts at stake could not be recovered from observed behavior,
because the analysis would then have limited empirical content.
Technically, the setting is fully determined by the 3-uple (U1,U2,λ)w h e r et h e
Ui and λ are functions mapping R3 to R. Two 3-uples (U1,U2,λ)a n d
³
˜ U1, ˜ U2, ˜ λ
´




for some increasing fi and (ii) for all (w1,w 2,Y,z)
in K, the solution to the household problem (2.2) is the same for (U1,U2,λ)a n d
³
˜ U1, ˜ U2, ˜ λ
´
. Condition (i) implies that the Pareto set for (U1,U2)a n d
³
˜ U1, ˜ U2
´
are always identical, while (ii) imposes in addition that the location of the decision
on this frontier is always the same for the two 3-uples. We deﬁne a structure as a
set of equivalent 3-uples.
To any given structure, one can associate labor supply and children expendi-
tures functions L1 (w1,w 2,Y,z),L 2 (w1,w 2,Y,z)a n dK (w1,w 2,Y,z), deﬁned as
the solution to the household problem (2.2). The structure is identiﬁable if this
mapping from structures to behavior functions is one to one, i.e. if two diﬀerent
22structures cannot generate the same labor supply and children expenditures func-
tions. Equivalently, the structure is identiﬁable if to any given labor supply and
children expenditure functions corresponds (at most) one structure.
3.1. Identiﬁability: Separability and Distribution Factors
In general preferences and the Pareto weights are not identiﬁable: An observed
reduced form, which relate each person’s labour supply and children expenditure
to wages (w1 and w2) and non-labor income (Y ), can be generated by a con-
tinuum of diﬀerent structural models. However we show below that under two
separate conditions identiﬁability obtains in the sense that if a structural model
is compatible with the ‘reduced form’ functions, all of which are observable, then
this structural model is unique.
Most straightforwardly if we know of a distribution factor, namely a variable af-
fecting the Pareto weights but not preferences of either individual, then we show
below that at most one structural model corresponds to the observed reduced
form.13 If no distribution factor is available then we show that the uniqueness
result is preserved but only within the class of separable utility functions. This
means that if a reduced form is compatible with separable preferences those pref-
erences will be unique. However, there will be a continuum of non-separable
preferences generating the same reduced form.
It turns out that separability has implications for the ‘reduced form’ condi-
tional labour supply functions. These implications can provide the basis for a
statistical test in an empirical model. If these conditions are not valid preferences
13Lack of a solution would imply that the reduced forms do not correspond to the solution of
a Collective optimisation problem.
23are not separable and thus only identiﬁa b l eb a s e do nad i s t r i b u t i o nf a c t o r . I f
they are valid, we can identify a separable preference structure that generates the
reduced form. Nevertheless the true preferences might still be non-separable but
there is no information to establish this, unless there is a distribution factor.
3.2. Identiﬁability with distribution factors
We now proceed to show that the knowledge of L1,L 2 and K (as functions of
w1,w 2,Y and z)i ss u ﬃcient for identiﬁability of the underlying structure. The
general strategy goes as follows: We ﬁrst consider the information embodied in
the labor supply function. We show that the basic intuition of the private con-
sumption case can readily be extended; i.e., it is still possible to identify individual
consumptions up to an additive constant (which may depend on the level of public
good expenditures). This, in turn, allows us to recover individual indirect utilities
up to an increasing function of the public good. We then show that by using the
public expenditure function we are able to identify the structure.
Labor supply and the sharing rule We ﬁrst concentrate on private expen-
ditures, and ﬁx public expenditures to some arbitrary level ¯ K. Thus technically
we consider as above some open subset O of K such that ∂K∗/∂z does not vanish
on O, and we impose the condition K∗ (w1,w 2,Y,z)= ¯ K, which by the implicit
function theorem is equivalent to z = ζ
¡
w1,w 2,Y, ¯ K
¢
.A sa b o v e ,w eu s et h en o -




w1,w 2,Y, ¯ K
¢¢
, hence of (w1,w 2,Y)s i n c e ¯ K is ﬁxed. Using for now
the change in variable y = Y − ¯ K, we can express L1,L 2 and ρ as functions of
(w1,w 2,y); for notational simplicity, we still denote these functions L1,L 2 and ρ,
24since no confusion is to be feared.























2 = w2 + y − ρ
¿From a theorem in Chiappori (1992), the knowledge of the two labor supply
functions allows one to recover the sharing rule and the individual utilities up to
an increasing constant; moreover, the constant is welfare irrelevant, in the sense
that it does not aﬀect the indirect utility. A formal statement is the following:
Lemma 1. For any given ¯ K, assume that two 3-uples (U1,U2,ρ) and
³
ˆ U1, ˆ U2, ˆ ρ
´
generate for all (w1,w 2,y) the same labor supplies in programs (3.1) and (3.2).




that, for all (w1,w 2,y),









































where f1,f2 are twice continuously diﬀerentiable mappings, increasing in their
ﬁrst argument. Moreover, the individual indirect utilities are such that, for all
25(w1,w 2,y) (with obvious notations):
ˆ V
1 ¡























In particular, the collective indirect utilities corresponding to the two solutions
coincide, again up to an increasing function of ¯ K.
Proof. See Chiappori (1992), Proposition 4. The result is ’generic’ is the sense
it requires a ‘regularity’ assumption on labour supplies (condition R in Chiappori
1992); speciﬁcally, the set of labour supply functions for which the result does not
hold is characterized by a partial diﬀerential equation. The only adjustment with
respect to Chiappori (1992) is that in our context, both the additive constant and
the increasing mappings fi are indexed by the level of public expenditures. That













Thus the functions ˆ V i and V i are diﬀerent; but the value taken by ˆ V 1 (resp. ˆ V 2)
for R =ˆ ρ (resp. R = y − ˆ ρ) and the value taken by V 1 (resp. V 2)f o rR = ρ
(resp. R = y − ρ) coincide up to an increasing function of K.
A consequence of the Lemma is that the derivatives can readily be computed:
∂ˆ V 1 ¡













∂ˆ V 1 ¡



























V 1, ¯ K
¢
∂ ¯ K
∂ ˆ V 2 ¡













∂ ˆ V 2 ¡



























V 2, ¯ K
¢
∂ ¯ K
Lemma 1 states that individual preferences and the sharing rule are identiﬁable
up to some additive constant, which may clearly depend on ¯ K. However, this
constant does not aﬀect the value taken by the individual indirect utilities V i and
their derivatives with respect to private shares ρi.14 As always, (indirect) utilities
can only be identiﬁed up to an increasing monotonic transformation; again, this
transformation may depend on ¯ K. In other words, one can identify a 3-uple
(V 1,V2,ρ) such that any other solution
³
ˆ V 1, ˆ V 2, ˆ ρ
´
must satisfy conditions (3.3)
to (3.7). From now on, thus, (V 1,V2,ρ) will be known functions; what remains
to be identiﬁed are the functions fi.
Finally, note that additional, over-identiﬁability restrictions are generated; an
example will be provided below in the Cobb-Douglas case.
14The functions V 1 and V 2 are identiﬁed only up to the same additive constant as the sharing
rule. However, the value taken by the functions (and their derivatives) at this sharing rule is
the same for all solutions.
27Preferences for public consumption We now consider the demand for public
goods. Any solution
³
ˆ V 1, ˆ V 2, ˆ ρ
´
, assuming an interior solution, must satisfy the
following ﬁrst order conditions:
∂ ˆ V 1/∂K
∂ˆ V 1/∂ρ1
+
∂ ˆ V 2/∂K
∂ ˆ V 2/∂ρ2
=1



















where the V i are known and the fi are unknown. Clearly, only the ratio
∂fi/∂K
∂fi/∂V
can (at best) be identiﬁable, reﬂecting the fact that fi is (at best) identiﬁable up
to some increasing transform only.


































We now proceed to show that generically (in a sense that will be made precise
later), the solution to this equation (if any) is unique. The result is coming from
the fact that the unknowns are functions of two variables only, while the equation
depends in general on four variables (w1,w 2,Y,z). To use this feature, let us ﬁrst
note that (3.9) is linear in φ1 and φ2. Thus, if there exist two distinct solutions





















=0 ( 3 . 1 0 )
At any point such that ψi (V i,K) 6= 0, one must have that ψj (V j,K) 6=0f o r





















,b et h es u mo fa
function of (V 1,K) and a function of (V 2,K). For generic functions V 1,V2 and












almost everywhere. A more precise statement can be found in Appendix. We
conclude that, when equation (3.9) has a solution, the solution is generically
unique.
Lemma 1 states that the labor supply functions allow one to identify the
collective indirect utilities up to an increasing function of K.W eh a v es h o w e dh e r e
that once children expenditures are taken into account, identiﬁability obtains up
to an increasing transform - i.e., the corresponding indirect preferences are exactly
identiﬁed.
It remains to see whether a solution to equ a t i o n( 3 . 9 )e x i s t sa ta l l ;t h i sg e n e r -
ates additional, over-identiﬁability restrictions, an example of which is provided
below for the Cobb-Douglas example. Finally, once a particular cardinalization









∂V 1/∂ρ+ ∂V 2/∂ρ
29Our results can be summarized in the following statement:
Proposition 3. Let L1,L 2 and K be given functions of (w1,w 2,Y,z). Generi-
cally, the knowledge of these functions identify the corresponding collective in-
direct utilities up to some increasing mappings. Moreover, for any particular
cardinalization, the Pareto weight is exactly identiﬁed.
3.3. Implications of separability for the reduced form labour supply
functions in the absence of distribution factors
To provide the basis for test of separability of leisure and consumption from ex-
penditure on children based on observable quantities, we derive the implications






which only depends on (Li,Ci)a n dn o to nK. However, taking this property to
data is a delicate task, because Ci is not observed.
In what follows, we assume that consumption is always a normal good at
the individual level, and that aggregate private consumption C is an increasing
function of non labor income. We ﬁrst deﬁne ˜ Li as i’s conditional demand for
leisure (i.e., i’s demand for leisure as a function of w1,w 2 and C);15 note that the
15Technically, let C (w1,w 2,y) denote the aggregate consumption function. From the implicit
function theorem, the relationship
C = C (w1,w 2,y)
can be inverted into
y = Γ(w1,w 2,C)
Plugging this into the individual demands for leisure gives
˜ Li (w1,w 2,C)=Li (w1,w 2,Γ(w1,w 2,C)).
30˜ Li are known from the data.
Since consumption is a normal good, the individual ﬁrst order conditions can







where φi is increasing. It follows that the conditional demands for leisure ˜ Li must













− C =0 ( 3 . 1 2 )
for some well chosen φi. In a lemma presented in the appendix we show that,
generically, this is not the case; i.e., such φi do not exist unless the functions ˜ Li
satisfy necessary conditions, which take the form of partial diﬀerential equations
(PDEs). These can be hard to take to the data but it does show that separa-
bility has implications for the observable relationships, even in the absence of a
distribution factor.
Moreover, the conditions can readily be tested on a parametric form. Assume,



































For generic values of the parameters, whether the PDE are not satisﬁed can be
checked; i.e., one cannot ﬁnd two functions φ1,φ2 such that (3.12) is satisﬁed.
Moreover, one can derive suﬃcient conditions for the existence of φ1,φ2.F o r
instance, the conditions are satisﬁed if e1 = e2 = 0, or alternatively if bi
j = ci =0
31for all i,j.16
The key point of this result is that it provides the basis for testing for sep-
arability, within the context of an empirical analysis, when a distribution factor
is unavailable; we exploit both the variation implied by unearned income and
the particular structure implied by separability. The conclusion may be that the
reduced form is not compatible with any separable preference structure. In the
presence of a distribution factor a simpler test can be devised.
3.4. Identiﬁcation under Separability
The proof of identiﬁability in the presence of distribution factors applies here
noting however that we are now solving for separable preferences. The knowl-
edge of labor supplies and expenditures on children K as functions of wages and
non labor income only is suﬃcient to recover the underlying structure. Indeed,
the only role of the distribution factor was to introduce an additional, observable
dimension that allows wages and non labor incomes to vary while children ex-
penditures are kept constant. This was needed because changes in expenditures
on children would generally modify the individual trade-oﬀ between leisure and
private consumption, hence hampering the analysis of labor supply. Clearly, this
concern does not exist in the separable case. In addition, it is possible that no
distribution factor is available, in the sense that any such variable may be consid-
ered as aﬀecting preferences. In his case separability is a suﬃcient condition that
allows identiﬁability.
16The computations are particularly tedious, and not reported here. They are available from
the authors.





















2 = w2 + y − ρ
While variations in wages and non labor income do change expenditures on
children, this eﬀect is irrelevant for the study of labor supply since the only impact
is through income eﬀects, which are anyway captured by the sharing rule. In
practice, labor supplies can be estimated as functions on wages and residual non
labor income y = Y − K; changes in K are fully captured through their impact
on y. Then the proof proceeds as before. Namely, programs (3.13) and (3.14)
identify the value of the individual utilities and of their derivatives; then the ﬁrst
order conditions for public expenditures generically recover the utility functions
W1 and W2, the argument being exactly the same as above.
3.5. A general example
In the Cobb-Douglas example given above (subsection 2.4), one can readily check
that the parameters of the structural model can indeed be recovered from the
demand functions, even in the absence of a distribution factor. This fact is an
immediate consequence of the results above, since the initial model was separable.
We now consider an example that illustrates the limits of identiﬁcation in the





















2 +( 1− α2)logC
2 + δ2 logK (3.15)
Note that U1 is not separable in the sense of (S) unless the coeﬃcient γ is zero.







δ1λ + δ2 (1 − λ)
(1 − γw1)
¶
(w1 + w2 + y)





α2 (1 − λ)
(1 + δ1λ + δ2 (1 − λ))




(1 + δ1λ + δ2 (1 − λ))
(w1 + w2 + y)
C
2 =
(1 − α2)(1− λ)
(1 + δ1λ + δ2 (1 − λ))
(w1 + w2 + y)
K =
δ1λ + δ2 (1 − λ)
(1 + δ1λ + δ2 (1 − λ))(1 − γw1)
(w1 + w2 + y)
A s s u m e ,a sa b o v e ,t h a tm e m b e r1( r e spectively 2) has a Pareto weight λ









α1l(1 − γw1) − γ (δ1lw1 + δ2w2)
(1 − γw1)
¶
w1 + w2 + y





(1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2




(1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2
(w1 + w2 + y) (3.18)
C
2 =
w2 (1 − α2)
(1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2
(w1 + w2 + y)
K =
δ1lw1 + δ2w2
((1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2)(1− γw1)
(w1 + w2 + y)
hence
C =
(1 − α1)lw1 +( 1− α2)w2
(1 + δ1)lw1 +( 1+δ2)w2
(w1 + w2 + y)












(1 − α1)lw1 +( 1− α2)w2
C
Now suppose we check whether the conditions characterizing separability are
satisﬁed. Not surprisingly, they are satisﬁed when γ = 0 (i.e., when the initial








2 − C =0
More surprisingly, however, the conditions are also satisﬁed when γ 6=0 . I n -
































then one can check that property (3.12) is satisﬁed.
While this result may seem paradoxical, it is in fact fully compatible with the
previous results, and it helps understanding their exact scope. In the absence of
a distribution factor, the model is not identiﬁable; hence the reduced forms (3.18)
are consistent with the structural model deﬁned by (3.15) and (3.16), but also with
a continuum of diﬀerent structural models. As it turns out, this particular example
is such that one of these alternative structures involves separable preferences. In
other words, there exist two separable utilities ˆ U1 and ˆ U2, obviously diﬀerent of
the U1 and U2 deﬁned by (3.15), that generate the same observable labor supply
35functions.17 This stresses a point made earlier. If the reduced forms have been
generated by some separable structure, they must satisfy conditions (3.12) above.
But the converse is not true. If the reduced forms satisfy conditions (3.12), they
are consistent with separable preferences, but this does not exclude the possibility
that they have been generated by some non-separable structure. Separability is an
identifying assumption, precisely in the sense that (without distribution factors)
uniqueness obtains only within the class of separable structures.
Finally, assume that a distribution factor is available; i.e., the coeﬃcient l is
a function of some observable variable z. Then identiﬁcation obtains within the
general set. The trick is that the separable utilities computed from the functions
φ1 and φ2 above can no longer be considered as solutions, because the second
utility explicitly depends on l, hence on z - which contradicts the deﬁnition of a
distribution factor. In other words, the identifying assumption is precisely that
the distribution factor z has no direct impact on preferences, and matters only
through the Pareto weight. Among the numerous structural models that generate
the reduced form (3.18), only the initial one (3.15) satisﬁes this property.
3.6. Application: Household production
Finally, we extend our basic model to include household production.18 Speciﬁcally,
we assume that child utility is ‘produced’ using speciﬁc expenditures and parental






17This case is peculiar in the sense that, in general, arbitrary reduced form are not consistent
with any separable structure, as illustrated by the derivation of the implications of separability
provided above.
18Ssee also Chiappori (1997) for identiﬁcation results with marketable household goods and
discussion of identiﬁcation issues with incomplete markets.
36where hK
i denotes the time spent by member i on household production. In





where Li denotes leisure, li market work and hi household work. Child welfare is










Since the outcome of the production is the child’s utility, it is not observable
and it is deﬁned only up to an increasing transformation. Namely, if a structure
entails the utility functions
¡
U1,U2,u K¢
and the Pareto weight λ, for any strictly
increasing function g one can deﬁne
³






























ˆ U1, ˆ U2, ˆ uK
´
, λ is observationaly equivalent to the initial one.

















are identiﬁable (at best).
37Clearly, identiﬁability of such a structure depends on the type of data that
are available. Without time use data one cannot identify household production
since neither the inputs nor the output is observed. Now suppose time use data















A ﬁrst result states that, generically, these equations (3.19) are suﬃcient to
identify the ϕi almost everywhere.19
Lemma 2. Take any point P =( w1,w 2,Y,z) at which the Jacobian determinant






























































is invertible almost everywhere on K . I nan e i g h b o u r h o o do fa n yp o i n tw h e r et h em a t r i xi s


















where ω1, ω2 and θ are known functions. Then (3.19) simply implies that φi = ωi, i =1 ,2.
38is non zero. There exists an open, connected neighborhood V of P such that the
functions ϕ1 and ϕ2 satisfying (3.19), if they exist, are unique over V.




























where ω1, ω2 and θ are known, continuously diﬀerentiable functions, and the
functions ω1,ω2,θ a r eu n i q u eo nV.I fo n eo ft h e∂ωi/∂z does not vanish at some
point of V, then (3.19) does not have a solution. If, alternatively, the ωi do not
depend on z over V,t h e nϕi = ωi, i =1 ,2 are the unique solution to (3.19) on V.
The Lemma above is local; it can however be extended to any connected
set over which the determinant D(w1,w2,Y ) (h1,h 2,K)d o e sn o tv a n i s h . A l s o ,t h e
condition ∂ω1/∂z = ∂ω2/∂z = 0 generates testable conditions on the functions hi




































then the ﬁrst two components of t are identically zero on V.
When the functions ϕi are exactly known, additional testable restrictions must
be imposed to reﬂect the fact that the ϕi are ratios of partials of the same function
uK. Namely, one can readily show that in the neighborhood of any point such
that ∂uK










39If this condition is satisﬁed, then uK i sk n o w nu pt oa ni n c r e a s i n gt r a n s f o r m .
B yt h er e m a r ka b o v e ,w ec a nw i t h o u tl o s so f generality choose arbitrarily this
transform (i.e., a particular cardinalization of uK); then uK is known as a function
of (K,h1,h 2). Since (K,h1,h 2) are themselves known functions of (w1,w 2,Y,z),
uK is ultimately known as a function of (w1,w 2,Y,z). Then Proposition 3 ap-
plies (replacing K (w1,w 2,Y,z)w i t huK (w1,w 2,Y,z)), and we conclude that the
structure is identiﬁable.
3.7. Taking the model to the Data
The development of our results has had empirical analysis in mind. Indeed the
identiﬁability results relate to the type of data one may have available such as
the UK Family Expenditure Survey or the US Consumer Expenditure Survey.
These include information on household composition, labour supply of individual
members and household consumption broken down by very detailed categories.
We require information on expenditures on children, such as food, clothing, ed-
ucation etc. which are not always available but can clearly be collected on the
basis of diaries. For identifying models of household production we would also
require a survey in which household members keep a time use diary such as in the
American Time Use Survey published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics or other
similar surveys listed in the BLS web site.20 T h et i m eu s ed a t aw o u l dn e e dt ob e
combined with expenditure data which is feasible and can be justiﬁed in terms of
the insights that can be gained for public policies.
However any empirical analysis would require a stochastic speciﬁcation and
of course additional identiﬁcation results in the presence of such randomness.
20See http://www.bls.gov/tus/home.htm#overview
40Typically we would allow some of the parameters in the utility functions of the
individual to be random, in which case we would end up generally with a model
which includes non-separable errors. Th i si saw e l lk n o wp r o b l e mi ne m p i r i c a l
demand and labour economics.
General identiﬁcation results are not possible here but we can illustrate the
issues given our Cobb-Douglas example earlier. In the utility functions 2.14 we
could allow the parameters α1, α2 and δ1, δ2 to be random. Although this seems
excessive, note that it is plausible to treat the members of the household in a
symmetric way. Moreover, the randomness in the parameters δ1 and δ2 ensure
that the expenditure on children is not a deterministic function given observables.
This speciﬁcation would imply non-separable errors in the two observable labour
supply equations and the equation for expenditures on children, which is com-
mon in structural models other than in the simplest of cases. Identiﬁcation and
estimation with exogenous wages and no corners is straightforward given suitable
distributional assumptions on the errors. With endogenous wages we would need
to specify a joint model of wages, labour supply and expenditures on children and
we could then use standard maximum likelihood methods for estimation. The
hardest issue one would encounter in an empirical implementation would be the
existence of corner solutions in labour supply, since censoring can lead to serious
identiﬁability issues both from the point of view of the theoretical collective model
and from the point of view of the econometric model.21 Finally note that one can
construe speciﬁcations with much simpler stochastic speciﬁcations, in which errors
are additive as in Blundell et al. (2003).
21See Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir (2003)
414. Conclusion
It is now becoming widely accepted that in order to analyze the way that resources
are shared within a household we need to model the household as a collective of
individuals rather than as one individual unit. This framework can address issues
such as targeting of beneﬁts or distribution of income and consumption within the
household. In addition to the clear welfare and policy implications of the collective
model it may also hold the key to why the restrictions from utility theory are often
rejected when the unitary model is applied to multi-member households. Indeed
recent evidence suggests that this may well be the case (Browning and Chiappori,
1999 and Blundell et al., 2001).
In this paper we extend the Chiappori (1992) framework to include expenditure
on public goods, which we like to think of as expenditure on children. We derive
the welfare implications of such a model and show that it oﬀers important insights
on the issue of targeting. This is uppermost in the policy agenda both in developed
and in developing countries since governments are particularly concerned about
delivering beneﬁts to children, such as schooling or nutrition subsidies. We show
that a shift in the Pareto weight towards member one, say, will always increase
member one’s private consumption (under separability). It will also increase the
demand of the public good if and only if the marginal willingness to pay of member
one is more sensitive to increases in private consumption than member 2. The
result emphasizes that basing policy on presumptions about the level of marginal
willingness to pay for the public good (e.g. children) is wrong.
The critical parameters for such a policy are an empirical question and that
is precisely why our identiﬁability theorems are of central importance for the
42empirical analysis of policies that are supposed to aﬀect the distribution of welfare
within a household. We prove identiﬁability of the structure (which consists of the
preferences of each adult in the couple over leisure, consumption and expenditure
on the public good and the Pareto weights) from data that is typically observable
in practice, namely labour supply of individual members, aggregate household
expenditure and expenditure on the public good.
Identiﬁability obtains under two diﬀerent conditions. First if a variable aﬀect-
ing the Pareto weights but not preferences is available - we call this a distribution
factor since it aﬀects the distribution of power in the household. Alternatively if a
distribution factor is not available, the structure is still identiﬁable if preferences
for consumption and leisure of each household member are weakly separable from
expenditures on public goods. Interestingly, we show that separability can has
implications for the reduced form labour supply functions that can be checked;
this can provide the basis for an empirical test even without the availability of
a distribution factor and allows the validity of the identiﬁcation strategy to be
examined. Even so the conclusion can be that the structure is inconsistent with
separable preferences and hence not identiﬁable without a distribution factor.
Finally we develop identiﬁability results for the case where the public good is
an input to household production together with time for each individual. Again
we show that the model is identiﬁable, under the assumption of productive eﬃ-
ciency, so long as time use data is available, detailing the time inputs that go into
household production (as opposed to pure leisure). Of course the measurement
problems here can be severe, but this discussion points to the importance of col-
l e c t i n gd a t ab o t ho nt i m eu s ea n dt h ei m p o rtance of distinguishing expenditure
on private and public goods.
435. Appendix
The Lemma and its proof on which the separability test is based.
Lemma 3. Let f and g be some arbitrary twice continuously diﬀerentiable func-
tions of (x,y,z). Assume that there exist two functions a,b such that
a(x,f (x,y,z)) + b(y,g(x,y,z)) = z (R)
for all (x,y,z). Then for any point (¯ x, ¯ y,¯ z) such that ∂f/∂z (¯ x, ¯ y,¯ z) 6=0 ,t h e
functions f and g must satisfy, in an open neighborhood of (¯ x, ¯ y,¯ z),e i t h e ro n eo r
two PDE.

















= u + bgv
where the functions u and v are deﬁned by u = −
fy
fz and v =
fy
fzgz − gy;n o t e
that these functions only depend on f and g, so that a condition involving these
f u n c t i o n si sac o n d i t i o no nf and g.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to x and z:
byggx = ux + bgggxv + bgvx
byggz = uz + bgggzv + bgvz
hence
gxuz − gzux =( gzvx − gxvz)bg
44Two cases can be distinguished:
• In the non generic case where gzvx − gxvz =0 ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
gxuz − gzux =0 ,w h i c hg i v e saP D E .




The right hand side expression must be expressed as a function of y and g
















In addition, we have that




and the two partials of b must satisfy the standard cross derivative restric-
tions, which provides a second PDE.
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